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The United States under the Trump administration is pursuing an
aggressive trade policy which emphasizes using unilateralism as
leverage to conclude bilateral trade "deals" that benefit industries
and workers in the United States. This articlefirst analyzes the United
States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), which the U.S.
administration has putforward as its most important accomplishment
in the field of international trade. The USMCA seeks to advantage the
United States' economy in eight key areas: manufacturing, especially
autos and trucks; services; agriculture; technology; pharmaceuticals;
textiles; energy; and retail. The USMCA has many positive
characteristics, which are mainly drawn from past multilateral trade
negotiations, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. However, the
USMCA also introduces new complexities into rules of origin
requirements and will require material changes in the supply chains
of many products made in North America. The USMCA also fosters
future business uncertainty since it will automatically terminate in 16
years.
The USMCA cannot take effect without Congressional approval
and creates a dilemmafor Congress. On the one hand, Congress can
approve the USMCA, with its advantages and disadvantages. On the
other hand, Congress can withhold approval with the hope that after
the 2020 election, a new President will support US. adherence to the
TPP, the Obama administration's update ofNAFTA that has become
effectivefor eleven Asia-Pacific nations.
The secondpart of this article analyzes the root economic causes
of U.S. trade deficits andputsforward suggestions for policy changes
that will improve the US. trade balance with the rest of the world.
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THE ART OF THE DEAL
I. INTRODUCTION
After more than two decades of relative quiet, international trade
and investment law has once again taken center stage in importance in
the annals of international law.' In a historic shift, the United States
has taken steps to implement new trade and investment policies
sparking anxiety and anger in capitals all over the world.
2 The
administration of President Donald J. Trump has announced new trade
policies based on an ideology of "economic nationalism."
3 The
purpose of these new trade policies is to improve the terms of trade of
the United States with respect to its economic partners. Although
China is singled out because of its large trade surplus with the United5
States, no economic partner of the U.S. is exempt from criticism.
NATO allies, Canada, and Mexico are caught up in this new movement
as well.6 As a result, the important trade settlements of 1993-94, the
North American Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) agreements achieved in the historic Uruguay Round in 1994,
are under fire.
' See, e.g., Zachary Karabell, Trump's Creative Destruction of the International
Order, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 11, 2018, 9:37 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/11/trumps-creative-destruction-of-the-
international-order/.
2 See, e.g., David Ignatius, The 'what ifs'offrayed ties with Europe, WASH. POST,
May 18, 2018, at Al9.
For a discussion of the basic tenets of economic nationalism, see generally Daniel
C.K. Chow, Ian M. Sheldon & William McGuire, The Revival ofEconomic
Nationalism and the Global Trading System, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2019)
(discussing economic nationalism).
4 See id.
5 See, e.g., Jeremy Diamond, Trump Knocks US-Japanese Trade Relationship as
Unfair, CNN (Nov. 5, 2017, 10:00 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/05/politics/trump-us-japanese-trade/index.htmi;
Mark Thompson & Charles Riley, Trump Attacks Germany as 'very bad'on trade,
CNN MONEY (May 26,2017,10:12 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/26/news/economy/trump-germany-bad-trade-
cars/index.html.
6See The Latest: Trump Renews Trade Criticism of Mexico, Canada, AP NEWS
(June 19, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/85a33d2bda604003bb30f
2 6 c6 3 a7 2 2 0 4 .
Gregg Ip, Weakened NAFTA, WTO Would Pave Wayfor Conflict, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. I8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/artices/weaker-trade-arbiters-pave-way-for-
conflict-1508340483.
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The Trump administration's actions concerning international trade
are unprecedented in the post-World War era. 8 They are troubling
because, for the first time in modem history, the United States is
blatantly and unapologetically disregarding established rules of
international trade and the multilateral trading system developed under
U.S. leadership during the past seventy years. For example, the Trump
administration is using tariffs as a cudgel to force other countries into
trade concessions. The United States has levied world-wide tariffs on
steel and aluminum, and, in addition, has imposed tariffs on $250
billion worth of Chinese goods, and is threatening to tax all imports
from China in 2019.10 As I have explained elsewhere," these tariffs
are blatant violations of U.S. obligations under the WTO Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Article II. The goal of the Trump
administration's trade policy seems to be using leverage to make
bilateral "deals" to ensure equal trade flows between countries and to
manage trade sector-by-sector notwithstanding objective legal rules.12
The most important accomplishment of the Trump administration
in the field of international trade is the United States-Mexico-Canada
Trade Agreement (USMCA), which was concluded on September 30,
2018. Although the USMCA is a three-party agreement, the United
States negotiation of this agreement was bilateral in nature. The United
States first reached a "preliminary agreement" in negotiations with
The conservative columnist George F. Will is among those who are extremely
critical of the President's trade policies. See George F. Will, The danger of
dabbling in protectionism, WASH. POST (May 10, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-danger-of-dabbling-in-
protectionism/2019/05/10/305a5d5a-7283-1 le9-9f06-5fc2ee80027a _story.html.
Ambassador Rufus Yerxa, former USTR and Deputy Director of the WTO, has
stated: "the Trump administration pretty much signaled it is throwing out the rule
book on trade." David J. Lynch et al., Trump imposes teel and aluminum tariffs on
E.U., Canada, Mexico, WASH.POST, May 31, 2018, at Al.
1o On December 1, 2018, at the G-20 Summit, the United States announced a 90-
day "cease-fire" during which President Trump agreed to hold off plans to raise
tariffs on January 1, 2019 on $200 billion of Chinese goods for 90 days in return
for a commitment by China to buy a "substantial amount" of U.S. products. Paul
Wiseman et al., US, China reach 90-day ceasefire in their trade dispute, AP (Dec.
2, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/589d268f276547b382ae85b3d6256a04.
I See generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Daniel C.K. Chow, The Perils of
Economic Nationalism and a Proposed Pathway to Trade Harmony, 30 STAN. L &
POL'Y REV. 115 (2019).
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Mexico in August 2018, then, using leverage gained from its
agreement with Mexico, struck an agreement with Canada. In order to
take effect, the USMCA must be approved by Congress; the Trump
administration is moving to gain this approval. President Trump signed
the USMCA on November 30, 2018 and announced that he will be
"formally terminating the North American Free Trade Agreement."'
3
At this writing the USMCA has not been formally submitted to
Congress for approval. The USMCA Implementation bill and
Statement of Administrative Action are still in preparation. However,
the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) has published its
assessment of the USMCA, and it is positive. According to the USITC
Report,14 the USMCA will create 176,000 new American jobs and
produce an increase in real GDP for the United States of $68.2
billion. 5 What is surprising about the USITC Report is the minimal
impact of the USMCA. Moreover, in June 2019, President Trump
threatened to impose 5 percent tariffs on all goods imported from
Mexico, and that this tariff would be increased to 25 percent, if Mexico
did not stop the immigration wave coming from Central America.
Although this threat was suspended when Mexico and the US came to
an agreement, President Trump reserved the right to renew it, stating,
"tariffs are a great negotiating tool."' 6
The USMCA presents a dilemma for the Congress. On the one
hand, the Congress may choose to approve the USMCA, accepting the
Trump administration's version of NAFTA, which includes several
troubling policy provisions, which are analyzed below. On the other
hand, the Congress may reject the USMCA, gambling that a new
President, who may take office in January 2021, will revive U.S.
adherence to the TPP, the Obama administration's update of NAFTA,
which has become effective for eleven Asia-Pacific nations under the
name, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
13 Paul Wiseman et al., US, China reach 90-day ceasefire in their trade dispute, AP
(Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/589d268f276547b382ae85b3d6
2 56a0 4 .
14 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and
on Specific Industry Sectors, Inv. No. TPA 105-003, USITC Pub. 4889 (Apr. 2019)
(with Errata), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub48
8 9 .pdf.
' Id. at 15-16.
16 Ben Foldy, Tariffs Loom Over Car Makers, Despite Mexico Deal, WALL ST. J.
(June 13, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tariffs-loom-over-car-makers-
despite-mexico-deal-11560435900.
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Partnership (CPTPP or TPP-11).17 The latter course is extremely risky
even if a new President who favors the TPP takes office in 2021,
because President Trump has announced his intention to terminate
NAFTA. Once NAFTA is terminated, the most-favored-nation
tariffs negotiated at the WTO may snap into place to govern trade
among the three North American countries.
Does President Trump have authority to terminate NAFTA? The
short answer to this question is "yes," but his authority will play out in
one of two ways: (1) a "clean" termination; or (2) a "dirty" termination.
For a clean termination of NAFTA, President Trump would formally
invoke the NAFTA withdrawal provision, Article 2205, which states
that withdrawal may be accomplished by "prior written notice" to the
NAFTA parties. In such a case withdrawal takes effect six months after
the date of written notice. However, since NAFTA is a Congressional
Executive Agreement, not a "treaty" under U.S. law, a clean
termination would require the Congress to repeal the NAFTA
Implementation Act of 1993,19 which is the legal mechanism by which
the U.S. is a party to NAFTA.
If Congress does not cooperate with the Trump administration and
does not repeal the NAFTA Implementation Act, President Trump
may attempt to terminate NAFTA by executive action alone. President
Trump could do this by sending a notice in writing to both Canada and
Mexico pursuant to Article 2205.20 This action would trigger section
109 of the NAFTA Implementation Act, which states that upon
17 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Dec. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
[hereinafter TPP]. The new CPTPP is one of the largest free trade agreements in
the world. The eleven member nations include 495 million people and have a total
GDP of $13.5 trillion. The parties to TPP are: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. See
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Gov'T
OF CAN. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/index.aspx?lang=eng.
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States,
by its rejection of the TPP, and considering the formation of the CPTPP, moves
from a GDP gain of $131 billion to a GDP loss of $2 billion. Matthew P.
Goodman, From TPP to CPTPP, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (Mar. 8,
2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (2018).
20 The President has constitutional authority to terminate treaties. See Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (termination of the Sino-American Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1954 by executive action).
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withdrawal of any party, sections 101-106 of the NAFTA
Implementation Act cease to have effect for that party. The most
important of such sections is section 101, which concerns the approval
and entry into force ofNAFTA. Section 101(b) provided authority to
President Clinton to exchange notes with Canada and Mexico to bring
NAFTA into force. President Trump may argue that when this
provision ceases to have effect, NAFTA itself no longer has effect.
This does not seem to be correct, as section 101 focusses on the
original presidential authority to bring NAFTA into effect, not
NAFTA termination. Thus, termination of NAFTA by executive
action alone would be a "dirty" termination in the sense that much of
the statutory underpinning of NAFTA, the NAFTA Implementation
Act, would remain in effect even after executive termination. No doubt
litigation would follow from which the outcome is problematic.
Nevertheless, President Trump may, by executive action
countermand NAFTA preferential tariffs for goods imported from
Canada and Mexico and decree that WTO tariffs apply to imports from
those nations. The authority to do this may be found in section
201(b)(1)(D) of the NAFTA Implementation Act, which states that the
President may proclaim modifications of NAFTA tariffs "as the
President determines to be necessary or appropriate to maintain the
general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions
with respect to Canada or Mexico as provided for by the Agreement."
2 '
If this authority is insufficient, President Trump can invoke section 125
of the Trade Act of 1974,22 which gives the President authority to raise
tariffs on imports following the termination of any trade agreement.
II. Ti UNITED STATES-MEXICO-CANADA TRADE AGREEMENT
Whereas virtually all previous free trade agreements were based
upon economic theory holding that trade between nations is a positive-
sum matter, all parties deriving benefits from the fact that freer trade
gives consumers access to a greater variety and cheaper products, and
producers gain access to an expanded market area,
23 the USMCA,
consistent with the Trump administration's view that international
trade is a zero-sum matter, seeks to benefit key economic sectors in the
United States, such as manufacturing, agriculture, technology,
21 19 U.S.C. § 3331(b)(1)(D) (2018).
22 19 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (2018).
23 For economic theory on free trade agreements, see generally Paul Krugman, The
Move Toward Free Trade Zones, 76 ECON. Riv. 6 (199 1).
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pharmaceutical, and services companies, at the expense of economic
interests in Mexico and Canada. Thus, the USMCA provides an
important paradigm for the "America First" international economic
policy espoused by the Trump administration.
The USMCA in part is based upon the following syllogism:
* Chronic trade-in-goods deficits are the principal cause of
declines in manufacturing employment and certain other
economic sectors experienced in the United States.
* Trade deficit problems and other international economic
imbalances may be rectified by trade and investment
agreements with other countries.
* Therefore, using economic and political leverage, the United
States must conclude trade agreements with other countries
that contain appropriate protectionist and protective
provisions.
I believe that this syllogism does not hold, and, therefore, the
USMCA is based in part upon false assumptions. Specifically, as I
have extensively analyzed in an earlier publication,2 4 the first two
assumptions in this syllogism are false. International trade is not the
chief culprit behind job losses in manufacturing, and trade deficits are
not amenable to correction by provisions in international trade and
investment agreements. In Part III of this article, I put forth my own
suggestions for correcting trade imbalances based on macroeconomic
theory and international law.
Nevertheless, I argue in this article in favor of Congressional
approval of the USMCA. I do so only because the USMCA retains the
core advantages of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP),
and because NAFTA needs updating.2 5 The USMCA represents a
positive updating ofNAFTA that is, in some ways, superior to the TPP,
which, ironically, President Trump disavowed upon coming into
office. At the same time, the USMCA contains provisions that are
24 See generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K. Chow, The Perils of
Economic Nationalism and a Proposed Pathway to Trade Harmony, 30 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 115 (2019).
25 President Donald J. Trump, Address at the G-20 Summit (Dec. 1, 2018) (stating
that he intended to terminate NAFTA before the end of 2018).
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problematic; the exposition below sorts these out. On the whole,
however, I believe the USMCA merits positive consideration.
The USMCA draws on three sources for its provisions. First, the
USMCA retains the core provisions of NAFTA, its predecessor trade
agreement. Second, the great majority of the USMCA draws on the
provisions of the TPP. Third, and most importantly, the USMCA
contains provisions specifically designed to benefit American
industries and workers. I discuss these in turn.
A. NAFTA 2.0
In many respects the USMCA functions as NAFTA 2.0 in that this
agreement continues the core provisions of NAFTA. Like NAFTA the
USMCA makes the territories of Mexico, Canada, and the United
States a North American free trade area,2 6 and each of the three
countries agrees to extend national treatment with regard to goods,27
including as a general rule, zero tariffs, to products of the other two
countries.2 8
In order to qualify for zero tariffs, however, the product in question
must satisfy the applicable rules of origin, which determine whether
the product may be legally considered as originating in North America.
Products which do not satisfy the applicable rule of origin tests are
subject to tariffs which are administered separately by each of the three
North American countries.
Rules of origin is one of the major differences between NAFTA
and the USMCA. Whereas NAFTA Rules of Origin are relatively
simple for most products,29 the USMCA Rules of Origin, Chapter 4,
which consists of 16 pages followed by a 185-page Annex 4-B on
Product Specific Rules of Origin,30 is highly complex, stating tighter
26 Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States,
and Canada art. 1.1, Nov. 30, 2018 [hereinafter USMCA], https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-
a reement/agreement-between.
2 Id. art. 2.3.
28 Id. art. 2.4.
29 NAFTA chapter 4 specifies five general ways that goods can qualify as
originating goods under the NAFTA rules of origin. See Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States gen. note 12, USITC Pub. 4991 (2019).
30 USMCA, ch. 4.
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rules of origin than under NAFTA for thousands of product categories.
In addition, a separate Appendix to Annex 4-B (33 pages) states
product-specific rules of origin for automotive goods (cars and trucks).
The USMCA also has a separate Chapter 6,31 Textiles and Apparel,
which specifies complex new Rules of Origin for textiles and apparel
products. The USMCA also contains tighter rules and more extensive
governmental powers on inspection, verification and enforcement of
32Rules of Origin. Certain problems related to rules of origin are
considered below.
In addition to eliminating tariffs on trade in products for goods
meeting the applicable rules of origin, the USMCA addresses non-
tariff barriers to trade, such as technical barriers to trade, sanitary, and
phytosanitary measures. Like NAFTA as well, the USMCA covers
Government procurement,3 3 as well as labor3 4 and environmental
matters.3 5
Like NAFTA, the USMCA comprehensively covers not only trade
36in goods but also other important areas of economic activity.
USMCA chapters address such matters as investment,3 7 cross-border
trade in services,38 temporary entry for businesspersons,3 9 financial
services,40 telecommunications,41 and intellectual property.42
The Investment Chapter 14 contains substantive provisions that
vary greatly from NAFTA. The overarching purpose of these
variations from NAFTA is to affirm the sovereign rights of the parties
and to limit the rights of investors accordingly. For example, USMCA
Articles 14-4 and 14-5 accord investors national treatment and most-
favored-nation treatment rights, but reserve the right to distinguish
investors or investments "on the basis of legitimate public welfare
31 Id art. 6.1.




4 Id. art. 23.1.
I5 1d. art. 24.1.
36 Id at Preamble.
37 1d. art. 14.1.
38 1d. art. 15.1.
39 Id. art. 16.1.
Id. art. 17.1.
42 Id. art. 18.1.
42 1Idart. 20. 1.
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objectives."'4 3 Similarly, the "minimum standard of treatment" that
investors have a right to expect (USMCA Art. 14-6) is defined as the
"customary international law minimum ... of treatment of aliens."44
Moreover, Article 14-6(4) provides that an action a party takes that
"may be inconsistent with an investor's expectations does not
constitute a breach of this Article."4 5 Article 14-16 states that
"[n]othing" in the Chapter shall be construed to prevent a party from
adopting any environmental, health, safety, or other regulatory
standard that "it considers appropriate.'46 These substantive provisions
are drafted to preclude investors from challenging or recovering
damages in response to many types of actions by a party that may
adversely affect investments.
The USMCA retains and adds to the institutional structure of
NAFTA. Like NAFTA, the USMCA is administered by a Free Trade
Commission' consisting of ministerial-level representatives of the
three parties. The Commission is assisted by a Secretariat established
by the parties.48 The USMCA continues various NAFTA bodies, such
as a Committee on Trade in Goods,4 9 a Committee on Agricultural
Trade,o a Committee on Textile and Apparel Trade Matters,' a
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade,5 2 and a Committee on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.53 In order to implement the
chapters on labor and environment, the USMCA establishes a Labor
Council54 and an Environment Committee.55 The USMCA continues
the work of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
established under NAFTA as well.56
43 Niyati Ahuja, USMCA: An Analysis of the Proposed ISDS Mechanism, KLUWER
ARBITRATION BLOG (Nov. 26 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kuwerarbitration.com
/2019/1 1/26/usma-an-analysis-of-the-proposed-isds-mechanism/.
44 USMCA art. 14.6, 12, at 14-5.
4 5 Id. art. 14.6, T 4, at 14-5.
46 Id. art. 14.16, at 14-15.
47 Id. art. 30.1.
48 Id. art. 30.3.
49 Id. art. 2.17.
50 Id. art. 3.7.
5 1 Id. art. 6.8.
52 Id. art. 11.9.
5 Id. art. 9.17.
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The USMCA retains the basic dispute settlement mechanisms
established under NAFTA:
* NAFTA Chapter 20 on Dispute Settlement is continued
pursuant to USMCA Chapter 31, as a three-step process
involving (1) consultations; (2) referral to the Free Trade
Commission; and (3) referral to a dispute resolution panel.
Non-implementation of a panel decision by a responding
party may lead to suspension of trade benefits by the
complaining party.
* USMCA Chapter 10 on Trade Remedies retains the
binational panel procedures of NAFTA Chapter 19 with
respect to review of national decisions involving
antidumping or countervailing duties. The binational panel
procedure will apply, however, only to Canada and the
United States; Mexico and the United States agreed to
forego this procedure.
* USMCA Chapter 14 on Investment retains investor-state
dispute settlement (ISDS) arbitration between the United
States and Mexico, but not between Canada and Mexican
Investors, or U.S. investors, or between Canadian
investors and Mexico, or the U.S.
Moreover, the scope of ISDS is substantially narrowed. Indirect
expropriation and breach of fair and equitable treatment are no longer
grounds for arbitration; 5 8and, as a precondition to arbitration, local
remedies must be exhausted.5 9 However, a special benefit is granted to
U.S. companies doing business with the government of Mexico.
Annex 14-E of the USMCA on Mexico-United States Investment
Disputes Related to Government Contracts permits claimants in
"covered sectors" to obtain arbitration on a full panoply of grounds,
including national treatment; most-favored nation treatment; minimum
standard of treatment (encompassing fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security); non-discriminatory treatment in case of
armed conflict or civil strife; and expropriation, including indirect
(regulatory) expropriation. The covered sectors for purposes of Annex
7 1d. art.14-D-1.
" Id. art. 14-D-2.
59 Id. art. 14-D-5.
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14-E are: oil and gas investments, power generation services,
telecommunications, transportation, and infrastructure.so
A. THE USMCA AND THE TPP
The great majority of the text of the USMCA is identical or a
paraphrase of the TPP, which President Trump repudiated, calling it
"the worst deal maybe ever signed anywhere." Despite this, many
chapters of the USMCA track the chapters of the TPP, frequently using
identical language. Borrowing from the TPP is evident in virtually
every chapter of the USMCA, but is especially evident in the following
chapters:
Origin Procedures
Customs and Trade Facilitation
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Trade Remedies
Technical Barriers to Trade
Government Procurement
Investment














Of particular interest are the USCMA Chapters on Environment and
Labor.
60 Id. art. 14-E-3.
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Chapter 24, Environment, is similar to both NAFTA 6 and TPP.
Each party agrees to enforce its own national environmental laws,62
but each party is accorded the right to "establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection and its own environmental
priorities."63 Each party agrees to provide the public with
information, to ensure that "an interested person" may request the
party's competent authorities to investigate possible violations of
national environmental laws,65 and to "ensure that the competent
authorities give those requests due consideration."66 The parties to the
USMCA recognize the importance of multilateral environmental
agreements and each agree to implement those to which it is a party.67
Multilateral agreements specifically mentioned in the USMCA include
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(1987);68 the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(1973 and 1978);69 the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent,
Deter, and Eliminate lUU [Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated]
Fishing (2009);70 and the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973).7 The USMCA
also sinles out trade and biodiversity,7 2 marine litter,7 3 invasive alien
75 76species, air quality,7 conservation of marine species, sustainable
77 78forest management,77 and sustainable fisheries management as issues
6i NAFTA, of course, addressed environmental concerns in a side agreement, the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) of 1994.
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation art. 1, Jan. 1, 1994.
Temp. Comm'n for Environmental Cooperation. This side agreement established a
North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation in order to address
regional environmental concerns, help prevent trade and environmental conflicts,
and promote the enforcement of national environmental laws. Id.
62 USMCA art. 24.4, ¶ 2.
6 Id. art. 24.3, 1, at 24-2.
Id. art. 24.5, 1, at 24-3.
Id. art. 24.6, 1, at 24-4.
66Id.
6 Id. art. 24.8, 1-2, at 24-5.6 Id. art. 24.9, 1, at 24-6.
69 Id. art. 24.10, 1, at 24-7.
7o Id. art. 24.21, 1, at 24-17.
71Id. art. 24.22, 2, at 24-18.
72 Id. art. 24.15, 1, at 24-10.
7 Id. art. 24.12, 1, at 24-9.
74 Id. art. 24.16, 1, at 24-11.
7 Id. art. 24.11, 1, at 24-8.
76 Id. art. 24.19, 1, at 24-14.
7 Id. art. 24.23, ¶2(a), at 24-21.
78 Id. art. 24.18, T 1, at 24-13.
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for special attention. The USMCA omits the TPP article ma'ndating
collective action on transition to a low-emissions economy.
79 An
important point mandated by the USMCA, not in either NAFTA or the
TPP, is a commitment by the parties to the "eventual elimination of all
subsidies that contribute to overfishing."80 The USMCA mandates
cooperation on conservation and trade
8 1 and the importance of
facilitatinp trade and investment in environmental goods and
services.
Like the TPP, the USMCA establishes an Environment Committee
and mandates the naming of national Contact Points in order to
implement the environmental chapter. 8 3 Decisions and reports of the
Environment Committee are to be adopted by consensus.8 4 Regarding
enforcement, "[a]ny person of a Party" may file a submission with the
Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
"asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental laws." 8 5 If this submission passes a 30-day screening
process, the Secretariat forwards this submission to the relevant party,
which must make a response within 60 days. 8 6 The Secretariat of the
CEC, then, may decide to prepare a "factual record" of the matter for
submission to the CEC, if instructed to do so by at least two members
of the CEC.8 This factual record is submitted to both the CEC and the
Environment Committee, and a "requesting Party" may request
"Environment Consultations" with any Contact Point of another party
concerning the matter.8 If such Senior Representative Consultations
fail, the matter is referred for Ministerial Consultations among the
concerned parties.89 If the matter is still unresolved by these multiple
levels of consultations, the "requesting Party" may request
consultations and obtain the establishment of a dispute settlement
Panel9 0 pursuant to Chapter 31 of the USMCA. Dispute settlement may
lead to a Panel Report that must be implemented by a party on pain of
TPP, supra note 17, art. 20.15 T 1.
so USMCA art. 24.20 ¶ 1, at 24-15.
81 Id. art. 24.22 13, at 24-19.
82 Id. art. 24.24 2, at 24-21.
83Id. art. 24.26 1-2, at 24-22.
84 Id. art. 24.26 5, at 24-23.
85Id. art. 24.27 1, at 24-24.
86Id. art. 24.27 3-4, at 24-24-24-25.
87Id. art. 24.28 1, at 24-25.
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suspension of benefits.91 Obviously this multi-level procedure is
purposefully convoluted and designed to preclude any meaningful
consideration of environmental concerns in opposition to government
policies.
USMCA Chapter 23, Labor, like the TPP, requires each party to
implement the International Labour Organization's Declaration on
Rights at Work in its domestic laws. This Declaration requires
observance of freedom of association of workers and recognition of
the right of collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced
labor; the effective abolition of child labor; and the elimination of
discrimination in employment and occupation.93 The USMCA also
contains a detailed statement of provisions Mexico agreed to adopt
with regard to worker representation in collective bargaining.94 Each
party agrees to "effectively enforce" its labor laws.95
The USMCA, like the TPP, creates a Labor Council composed of
senior governmental representatives as a vehicle for consultations and
to receive communications from "interested persons."96 Each party
also agrees to establish "Contact Points" to address labor matters
relevant to the USMCA. 9 7 Each party, through its contact point, must
provide for receipt and consideration of written submissions from
"persons of a Party."98 Government-to-government consultations on
labor matters are provided first at the level of the contact points;9 9 if
this is unsuccessful, consultations move to the ministerial level.'00If
the matter is still unresolved, a party may request the establishment of
a dispute resolution Panel pursuant o Chapter 3.101
We have over twenty-five years of experience under the NAFTA
labor side agreementl02 on dealing with trade and labor issues, but the
91Id. art. 31.17, 31.18, and 31.19.
92 Id. art. 23.3.
93 d
94 Id. Annex 23-A.
95 Id. art. 23.5.
96Id. art. 23.14.
9 Id. art. 23.15.
9 Id. art. 23.11.
' Id. art. 23.17, § 2.
' 0 0 Id. art. 23.17, § 6.
1o 0Id. art. 23.17, § 8.
102 NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOUR COOPERATION, Government of
Canada, https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-
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record is not good. The idea behind including a labor chapter in a trade
agreement is to ensure the enforcement of national labor laws in order
to remove competitive advantages in trade based upon unfair
exploitation of workers. Only one case addressing trade and labor
rights has ever been formally considered, the US. - Guatemala Labor
Arbitration Rulingl0 3 under CAFTA-DR, the Central American-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement between five Central
American nations, the Dominican Republic and the United States.'
0 4
This case, which related to enforcement of Guatemala's labor laws,
was filed in 2008 by the AFL-CIO and six Guatemalan trade unions.'os
After numerous delays, the arbitration panel constituted to hear the
matter handed down a decision in 2017, concluding that, although
Guatemala failed to effectively enforce certain labor laws, there was a
failure of proof that such failures affected trade, except for one
instance: but in that instance, the failure to enforce was not sustained
or recurring; the panel concluded that there was no violation of
CAFTA-DR Article 16.2.1(a).106 The USMCA would not appear to
change this result,'0 7 since Article 23.5 (Enforcement of Labor Laws)
uses identical language to the CAFTA-DR agreement, requiring that a
failure to enforce must be both systematic or recurring and affect trade
or investment.08
development/services/labour-relations/international/agreements/naalc.htmI (last
visited on Oct. 10, 2019).
103 In the Matter of Guatemala - Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article
16.2.I(A) ofthe CAFTA-DR, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-
agreements/guatemala-submission-under-cafta-dr (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
104 The Dominican Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA - DR), Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-
fta/final-text. This free trade agreement was concluded in 2004. Id.
1o See NORTI IAMERICAN AGREEMENTON LABOUR COOPERATION,supra note 102.
0 In the Matter of Guatemala - Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article
16.2.I(A) of the CAFTA-DR, Final Report of the Panel, INT'i.TRADE ADMIN.
(2017),144-45, 169.
107 UnitedStates-Mexico Trade FactSheet, Modernizing NAFTA into a 21st
Century Trade Agreement, OlICE O Till. U.S. TRADIE REPRESENTATIVE (2018),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/
20 18/august/united-
states-mexico-trade-fact-sheet-1. The USMCA thus belies its billing by the USTR
that national labor obligations will now be "fully enforceable." Id.
108 USCMA art. 23.5, nn.8-9 (the USMCA does, however, contain footnotes that,
for "greater certainty" provide dictionary definitions of "sustained or recurring"
and "affecting trade or investment").
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The TPP contains a side agreement forbidding parties to engage in
currency manipulations or interventions in order to gain a trade
advantage. The USMCA spells out the same pledge in Chapter 33,
Macroeconomic Policies and Exchange Rate Matters.
C. AMERICAN "ADVANTAGE" PROVISIONS
The most important provisions of the USMCA are those that are
designed to produce economic advantages for American industries and
workers. This is where the USMCA represents a sharp break from
previous trade agreements that respected the rules-based, objective,
free-market legal rules of the multilateral trading system. The
USMCA, in contrast, focusses on trade outcomes that will benefit the
U.S. economy. The USMCA unapologetically seeks to tilt the trade
"playing field" in favor of the United States. The provisions of the
USMCA seek to advantage the United States in the following eight
important economic areas:








I discuss each of these areas in turn.
1. MANUFACTURING
The USMCA seeks to benefit manufacturing industries based in
the United States and to foster more manufacturing activity in the
United States.
a. AUTOMOTIVEGOODS
The most important American "advantage" provisions of the
USMCA involve the automotive industry, cars, light trucks, heavy
trucks and the parts and components these entail. The automotive
industry will face stringent new rules of origin whose compliance will
116 [Vol. 14:1
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be necessary to qualify for zero tariff treatment. The new rules of
origin provide:
* At least 70% of the steel and aluminum used to produce
automotive products must originate in North America.1
0 9
* At least 75% of the content of passenger automobiles and light
trucks must originate in North America.i 1
0 This is an increase
from the NAFTA rule requiring only 62.5%.
* A new labor value content rule will require that 40% to 45%
(depending on the type of vehicle) of automotive production
activities (components and assembly) be done by workers
earning at least $16 per hour.
First, these provisions are designed to shift production of autos and
automotive parts to the United States. Second, it is evident that these
rules will benefit the "big three" U.S. automakers, who are better
positioned to comply than are European and Asian "transplant"
factories in North America.
Third, to make doubly sure that automotive production will shift
predominately to the United States, the USMCA, Article 32.2,
preserves the right of the United States pursuant to section 232 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (as amended),"' to impose "national
security" tariffs on Canadian and Mexican vehicles and automotive
components imported into the United States if they exceed certain
quota limits. The quota on passenger vehicles for each of the two
countries is specified to be 2.6 million vehicles per year. The quota on
auto parts is $32.4 billion from Canada and $108 billion from Mexico
per calendar year.12 These two quotas, while not now constraining, set
a precedent for "managed trade" in autos and auto parts at some future
time.
0 Idd art. 4, 4-B-1-25 (this is the applicable general rule). See id. art. 4, 4-B-77 to
78 (exceptionally, certain categories of tariff shifts require 50% or 60% North
American content).
" oId. art. 4, 4-B-1-19 (this requirement would be phased in over three years).
1 I9 U.S.C. § 1862 (2015).
112 MX-US Side Letter on 232 from U.S. Trade Representative Robert E.
Lighthizer to Mexican Secretary of Economy Ildefonso Guajardo Villarreal (Nov.
30, 2018), in USMCA; CA-US Side Letter on 232 from U.S. Trade Representative
Robert E. Lighthizer to Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland
(Nov. 30,2018), in USMCA.
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In addition, as of June 1, 2018, both Canada and Mexico became
subject to existing U.S. section 232 tariffs on imports of steel (25%)
and aluminum (10%). These tariffs were initially unaffected by the
USMCA. The United States reportedly wanted to negotiate quotas on
imports of Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminum as a condition
of lifting these tariffs.' 13 But Canada and Mexico refused to accede to
metal import quotas, and on May 28, 2019, the White House
announced an agreement lifting the tariffs in exchange for promises by
Canada and Mexico to monitor their steel and aluminum exports to
prevent transshipments from other nations and to restrain any possible
unfair subsidization or dumping of metals' exports to the United
States.'14
In retaliation for these tariffs, both Canada and Mexico filed
complaints against the United States at the WTO, and retaliated by
imposing tariffs on U.S. goods. Canada imposed tariffs on $12.8
billion of U.S. agricultural products, and Mexico imposed tariffs on $3
billion of U.S. farm products.' 15When the agreement was announced
on May 28, 2019, Canada and Mexico revoked these tariffs and
dropped their cases at the WTO.' 16 But the May 28 agreement seems
only to be an uneasy truce. The USMCA leaves open and does not
resolve the important issue of possible future US national security
tariffs.
b. OTHER MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS
The USMCA rules of origin chapter117 contains additional stricter
requirements for North American content that apply to a wide variety
1 Alan Rappaport & Glenn Thrush, US. Weighs Steel Quotas, Instead of Tariffs
on Canada nd Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018 /11/21/us/politics/us-canada-mexico-steel-
tariffs.html (discussing how the United States has negotiated a steel quota of 2.68
million metric tons per year with South Korea and is negotiating such quotas with
other countries as well).
114 Ratan Singh, WTO Drops US Mexico Canada Metal TariffDisputes, STEEL
NEWS (July 12, 2019), http://steelguru.com/steel/wto-drops-us-mexico-canada-
metal-tariff-disputes/543991.
11 See Whitney Filloon, These Are All the Foods Being Affected by Trump's Trade
War, EATER (last updated Sept. 24, 2018),
http://www.eater.com/2018/7/18/17527968/food-tariffs-trump-canada-china-
mexico-eu.
116 See Singh, supra note 114.
n1 USMCA, art. 4, Annex 4-B.
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of manufactured products and their components, includihg chemicals,
plastics and rubber, articles of leather, handbags, footwear, articles of
wood, paper products, glass, ceramics and various types of metals. The
USMCA contains sectoral annexesi18 that specifies enhanced
regulatory compatibility for chemicals, cosmetics products,
communications technology, energy performance standards, and
medical devices.
2. SERVICES
Like the TPP, the USMCA places primary importance on services
trade, considering the United States' competitive advantage with
respect to services. Chapter 15 on Cross-Border Trade in Services,
requires the parties to extend national treatment and most-favored
nation treatment to service providers." 19 Most limitations on service
providers are forbidden,12 0 and local presence cannot be made a
precondition to cross-border supply of services.121 Regulations
affecting the delivery of services must be administered in a reasonable,
objective, and impartial manner.122 Annexes to Chapter 15 cover
delivery services, 1 23 transportation services,124 and professional
services.125
The USMCA Chapter 17 covers the important topic of Financial
Services. Updated market access commitments include a wide range
of financial services, including insurance, banking, portfolio126
management, investment advice, and electronic payment services.
Good regulatory practices in government licensing and other market
access authorizations are guaranteed.12 7 Cross-border transfer of data
is fully guaranteed as well.1 2 8 For the first time in any trade agreement,
Chapter 17 prohibits local data storage requirements in circumstances
where a financial regulator has access to data that it needs to fulfill its
regulatory and supervisory mandate.'29
118Id. Annexes 12-A to 12-E.
` 
9 Id. art. 15.
1
20 Id. art. 15.5.
121 Id. art. 15.6.
122 Id. art. 15.8.
123 Id. Annex 15-A.
124 Id. Annex 15-B.
125 Id. Annex 15-C.
126 Id. art. 17.1.
127Idart.17.13.
128 Id. art. 17.19.
129 Id. art. 17.20.
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Telecommunication services are addressed in USMCA Chapter 18,
which applies to (1) any measure relating to access to and use of public
telecommunications networks or services; (2) any measure relating to
obligations of suppliers of public telecommunications services; (3) any
other measure relating to public telecommunications networks or
services; and (4) any measure relating to the supply of value-added
services. Detailed sections address each of these topics. Chapter 18
provides for the use of public telecommunications networks to move
information in each party's territory and across their borders, as well
as for access to information in databases in the territory of any party.
Article 18.15 endorses a policy of technology neutrality and prohibits
requirements that dictate technology choices.
Chapter 32 of the USMCA continues Canada's cultural industries
exemption,13 0 which was originally in NAFTA. This exemption
applies to the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines,
periodicals or newspapers in print or machine readable form; and
radiocommunications in which transmissions are intended for direct
reception by the general public, and all radio, television, and cable
broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programing and broadcast
network services.
3. AGRICULTURE
The USMCA addresses a wide range of agricultural issues, most
with the aim of fostering market access for U.S. agricultural producers
in Canada and Mexico. Under the USMCA all food and agricultural
products having zero tariffs under NAFTA remain at zero tariffs. The
USMCA addresses everal problem areas under NAFTA. Chief among
such problems is that all three nations administer tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs) for certain agricultural products. Pursuant to a TRQ, an
amount of product called the "quota" is allowed to enter duty free, but
imports exceeding the quota are typically subject to a high, prohibitive
tariff. The U.S. TRQs involve mainly peanuts, sugar, syrup and sugar
containing products; Mexico's TRQs involve sugar and several other
products, such as beef, rice, limes and onions. Canada's TRQs involve,
most importantly, dairy, eggs, and poultry. The USMCA, Chapter 3 on
Agriculture provides for a joint, three-party Committee on
Agricultural Trade, and the three nations agree to forbid export
o Id art. 32.6.
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subsidies and to cooperate on domestic support and other agricultural
trade issues. Export restrictions for the purpose of food security are
permitted under the criteria contained in GATT Article XI:2(a).'
3 1
Chapter 3 contains two bilateral annexes. Annex 3-B, titled,
"Agricultural Trade Between Mexico and the United States,"
preserves existing TRQs between the U.S. and Mexico; Annex 3-A,
titled, "Agricultural Trade Between Canada and the United States,"
preserves existing TRQs between the US and Canada.
The three parties to the USMCA agreed to consult concerning and
to reduce trade-distorting agricultural policies and standards, to
improve transparency, and to ensure non-discriminatory agricultural
product standards. Chapter 9 of the USMCA strengthens and requires
science-based methods and increased transparency with respect to
sanitary and phytosanitary measures imposed by the three parties.
a. CANADA DAIRY, POULTRY AND EGGS
Canada operates supply management schemes with respect to
dairy, poultry and egg products. Under these schemes, farmers may
sell products up to their individual quotas; they sell their products at
prices fixed by farmer-run provincial marketing boards. This system
involves tariff-quota limits on imported products under which imports
enter duty free up to a designated quota, but once the quota is fulfilled,
prohibitive tariffs apply. Under the USMCA, Canada agreed to expand
the tariff-rate quotas to benefit U.S. exporters with respect to all three
agricultural categories.132 U.S. access to the Canadian dairy market
will expand to 3.59% of domestic Canadian production. This is
marginally better than was the case under the TPP, which opened the
Canadian market to about 3.25% of domestic Canadian production.
Canada also agreed to eliminate milk price classes 6 and 7, oening
the way for more imports of U.S. ultra-filtered milk products.
Canada also agreed to adopt measures to limit its export of certain
milk products to the United States. Export caps apply to Canadian
exports of skim milk powder, protein concentrates, and infant formula.
Once these caps are exceeded, Canada must levy an export surcharge
of C$ 0.54 per kilogram.134
13' Id. art. 3.5.
132 Id. Annex 3-A, art. 3.A.2.
'3 Id. art. 3.A.3.
I.34 Id.
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b. CANADA WHEAT
Canada agreed to grade imports of U.S. wheat in a manner no less
favorable to the grading of Canadian wheat. No country of origin
statement may be required upon quality grading or inspection.135
c. CHEESENAMESAND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS
Mexico agreed not to restrict imports of U.S. cheeses labeled with
certain names; the parties agreed to discuss geographical indications
and not to prevent U.S. producers from using common names for
cheeses and other agricultural products.136
d. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
The three parties agreed to non-discriminatory and transparent
treatment regarding the sale, distribution and labeling of wine and
distilled spirits.'3 7
e. PROPRIETARY FOOD FORMULAS
In an Annex on Proprietary Food Formulas, the three parties agreed
to protect the confidentiality of information provided in response to
regulations and standards relating to prepackaged food and food
additives. 138
f AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
The parties to the USMCA agreed on a common approach and
common standards relating to agricultural biotechnology.'39
. Id. art. 3.A.4(2).
i36 MX-US Side Letter on Cheeses from U.S. Trade Representative Robert E.
Lighthizer to Mexican Secretary of Economy Ildefonso Guajardo Villarreal (Nov.
30,2018), in USMCA.
1
37 See USMCA, Annex 3-C, art. 3.C.3.
138 Id. Annex 3-D(3).
139 Id. art. 3.14-16.
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4. TECHNOLOGY
A very important objective of the USMCA is to advantage U.S.
technology companies, including creators of new technology and
technology entrepreneurs in order to maintain American leadership in
technology. To this end, two USMCA chapters are of overriding
importance: Chapter 19 on Digital Trade and Chapter 20 on
Intellectual Property Rights.
The USMCA provisions on digital trade are similar to those in the
TPP. Highlights include:
* Prohibiting duties and other discriminatory measures on digital
products distributed electronically (e-books, software, videos,
etc).
* Ensuring that data may be transferred across borders.
* Minimizing or prohibiting limits on where data may be stored
and processed.
* Facilitating electronic authentication and digital signatures.
* Prescribing enforceable consumer protections for privacy and
against unsolicited communications in the digital marketplace.
* Limiting governments' ability to require disclosure of
proprietary computer source codes and algorithms, to better
protect the competitiveness of digital suppliers.
* Promoting collaboration in dealing with cybersecurity and
facilitating best practices to keep networks secure.
* Promoting open access to government-generated public data.
* Limiting the civil liability of internet platforms for third-party
content and enhancing the economic viability of these engines
of growth that depend on user interaction and content.
The USMCA Chapter 20 on Intellectual Property Rights is also
virtually identical to the TPP. Many of these provisions require Canada
and Mexico to change their laws to enforce U.S. standards for
protection of intellectual property. Examples include:
* Strong standards against circumvention of technological
protection measures protecting such works as digital music,
movies and books.
* Strong protections for trade secrets.
* Enhanced provisions for protecting trademarks, including
well-known marks.
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* Procedural safeguards for geographical indications so that
using common names is not prevented.
* Copyright safe harbors that provide predictability for
legitimate companies.
* A minimum copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years.
* Strong patentability standards and patent office best practices.
* Patent protection standards geared especially to small- and
medium-sized businesses.
* Strong enforcement provisions and penalties against violators.
5. PHARMACEUTICALS
The USMCA also champions the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.
Chapter 20 provides special protection for biologic pharmaceutical
products, including protection for a minimum term of ten years.140
Chapter 20 also provides for procedures to reciprocally recognize
safety and efficacy tests for pharmaceutical products, thereby
enhancing the marketing of such products.14 1 Chapter 12, Annex 12-F
of the USMCA provides for procedural cooperation among authorities
of the three nations concerning the pharmaceutical marketing
authorization process.
6. TEXTILES AND APPAREL
The USMCA Chapter 6 on Textiles and Apparel Goods contains
provisions designed to incentivize greater U.S. production of textiles
and clothing. Complex new rules of origin and origin procedures
contained in USMCA Chapters 4 and 5 apply to textiles and apparel
goods. These rules of origin are designed to promote greater use of
"made-in-USA" fibers, yams and fabrics. These rules limit inputs of
non-North American inputs in textile and apparel trade; and require
that sewing thread, pocketing fabric, narrow elastic bands, and coated
fabric that is incorporated into finished apparel be made in North
America in order for such textile and apparel products to qualify for
free trade benefits. 142
1
40 Id. art. 20
141 id
142 Id. art. 6.1(2) and (3).
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The USMCA establishes a Committee on Textile and Apparel
Mattersl43 and contains upgraded inspection and enforcement
standards.144
7. ENERGY
Although Chapter 8 of USMCA recognizes Mexico's sovereign
ownership of hydrocarbons in its subsoil, neither Mexico nor Canada
place any restriction on international investment in energy resources,
oil and natural gas, by U.S. companies. The USMCA leaves intact the
ISDS remedy against Mexico for interference with U.S. investment.
145
In side letters attached to the USMCA, Canada and Mexico agree with
the United States concerning disciplines related to energy regulatory
measures and energy regulatory transparency.146 Canada and the
United States chose not to renew the Energy Proportionality Clause
contained in NAFTA Article 605 forbidding the right of either nation
to restrict access to each other's domestic oil and gas production in the
event of shortage.
8. RETAIL
Chapter 7 of USMCA (Customs Administration and Trade
Facilitation) greatly aids online and mail order retailers based in the
United States. Delivery of express and online shipments will be faster
under the USMCA, and the de minimis level for duty free and tax free
delivery is raised as follows: for Mexico, USD117 for customs duties
and USD50 for sales taxes; for Canada, CDI50 for customs duties and
CD40 for provincial sales taxes.'4 7
A. EVALUA77NG 77/E USMCA
The USMCA is billed as a new generation of trade agreement, a
reflection of the Trump administration's nationalist "America First"
economic and political philosophy. In reality, however, the USMCA
144 Id. art. 6.8.
144 Id. art. 6.6.
145 Id. Annex 14-D, art. 14.
146 See also CA-US Side Letter on Energy from U.S. Trade Representative Robert
E. Lighthizer to Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland (Nov. 30,
2018), in USMCA.
147 Id. art. 7.8.
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is mainly an updated NAFTA. If the USMCA is approved by
Congress, the North American free trade area which has linked the
United States with Mexico and Canada economically for over two
decades would continue in a somewhat different form. The USMCA
has many positive points: this agreement preserves NAFTA while
providing necessary updates and expanded market access. The
USMCA would enact many of the reforms proposed in the now
repudiated TPP. The USMCA will benefit American industries,
especially agriculture and manufacturing. As the only candidate to
replace and update NAFTA, the USMCA merits favorable
consideration.
Nevertheless, the USMCA poses distinct uncertainties and dangers
to American economic and political interests.
First, the USMCA, combined with section 232 tariffs on metals
and negotiations to establish quotas on manufactured products, backed
by the threat of additional section 232 tariffs,14 8 makes clear the
intention of the Trump administration to construct a protected North
American manufacturing area that is relatively isolated from the rest
of the world. This coordinated strategy aims to boost manufacturing
industries in a part of the world dominated by the United States. The
vision of the Trump administration is to establish a "renaissance" of
American industrial activity in key economic areas, such as autos,
steel, aluminum, chemicals, and other manufactured products. The
combination of actions of the Trump administration - new rules of
origin, labor value content rules, tariffs and quotas - accomplishes this
by building a protective wall around much industrial production in
North America, where the U.S. can easily establish dominance. This
market protection and isolation is bound to lead to higher production
costs for automotive products, steel and other manufactured products
that will inevitably lead to price increases for consumers. The North
American market as a whole will become a high-cost production area
less able to compete with lower-cost regions which are now on the rise.
For example, U.S. share of global light vehicle production is already
declining;149 isolation of the North American market as a high-cost
148 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce: U.S. Dep't of Commerce Initiates
Section 232 Investigation into Auto Imports (May 23, 2018),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/05/us-department-of-
commerce-initiates-section-232-investigation-auto-imports.
149 See DELOITTE, A New Era, Accelerating Toward2020-An Automotive Industry
Transformed, 2-4 (2017).
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region is bound to accelerate this trend. The U.S. will suffer
economically compared to lower-cost regions of the world.
Second, the new and complex rules of origin contained in the
USMCA will compel tens of thousands of companies to reevaluate and
to alter their supply chains on a plant-by-plant and even a product-by-
product basis. Every firm doing business on a global basis will be
affected, and each will be affected in a different way. This process
presents a huge challenge; many companies will have to decide
whether to change contract suppliers and/or to make new investments
in order to meet the new rules. Even under existing rules, small
changes in design of a product can have huge effects. For example, a
small company in Portland, Oregon, that makes and sells footwear has
found that the addition of a sheath of fabric to the sole of a boot or shoe
can circumvent an existing 37.5% tariff on imported rubber soles: a
fabric sole pays a tariff of only 12.5%.5o Such arcane distinctions
abound in existing rules of origin, and the USMCA will make such
rules even more stringent and complex. Reexamining and making
necessary supply chain changes will be a massive undertaking.
Third, the sunset clause of the USMCA creates uncertainty as to
the future of trade in North America as well as to the economic
relationship between North America and the rest of the world. The
USMCA provides for automatic termination of the entire agreement
16 years after the date of its entry into force.5 Moreover, a "joint
review" of the agreement is mandated to begin no later than the sixth
anniversary of its entry into force.152 The brevity of these time frames
creates great uncertainty. Businesses will be reluctant to take decisions
on supply contracts and investments in the face of such uncertainty.
Fourth, like many of the other trade and investment policies
adopted by the Trump administration, the USMCA seems to be
directed both explicitly and implicitly against China. Article 32.10 of
the USMCA provides that "[e]ntry by any Party into a free trade
agreement with a non-market country, shall allow the other Parties to
terminate [the USMCA]." This is clearly directed toward Mexico and
Canada, threatening the end of preferred access to the U.S. market if
"5 Jim Tankersly, A Winter-Coal Heavyweight Gives Trump's Trade War the Cold
Shoulder, N.Y. TIMis,
https://www.nytimes.com/2 018/11/23/business/economy/columbia-sportswear-
trump-trade-war.html, Nov. 24, 2018, at Al.
'5' USMCA, art. 34.7.
152 Id.
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they choose a relationship with China. Combined with massive tariffs
levied on Chinese products and the enactment of the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, the USMCA
represents what seems to be a piece of the strategy to decouple the
American economy from China. Thus, the USMCA is aimed, in part,
at impeding the rise of China, which is the second-largest economy in
the world and is growing at a rate approximately three times the rate
of growth of the United States. While there are many trade and
investment issues and problems with respect to China that should be
addressed,15 3 this blatant strategy to impede Chinese economic and
political influence is bound to fail. What may result is the division of
the world into economic spheres of influence, which would be a
dangerous development.
Fifth, the American "advantage" provisions of the USMCA are
announced to be a key part of the effort by the Trump administration
to use economic nationalism and neo-mercantilist trade agreements to
rebalance trade between the United States and its trading partners. As
I have written elsewhere,'54 this effort is misguided and will not work.
In the next section of this article, I propose a better solution to U.S.
trade imbalances.
III. A MACROECONOMIC SOLUTION TO TRADE IMBALANCES
The underlying cause of the U.S. trade deficit is the
macroeconomic imbalance between the low U.S. savings rate and the
U.S. need for domestic investment capital. Since U.S. savings fall far
short, the U.S. economy is sustained by massive amounts of foreign
investment capital.15 5 The sources of this investment capital are the
dollars earned when U.S. trading partners run trade surpluses with the
United States.156 Understanding these macroeconomic facts is key to
understanding trade imbalances problems.
113See Schoenbaum & Chow, supra note 11.
154 id
See James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, The U.S. Trade Deficit: How Much
Does It Matter, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-trade-deficit-how-much-does-it-matter
(describing how shortfall in savings are financed by foreign lenders).
156See Kimberly Amadeo, US. Debt to China, How Much It Is, Reasons Why, and
What If China Sells?, THE BALANCE (Aug. 01, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-debt-to-china-how-much-does-it-own-3306355
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Superficial analysis may lead to the conclusion that the U.S. trade
deficit may be cured by erecting trade barriers to imports and getting
partners to revalue their currencies against the U.S. dollar. This is a
premise of the Trump administration's economic nationalism.
Empirical evidence shows that this does not work. The Reagan
administration employed this strategy with respect to Japan in the
1980s.' 57 Not only did this strategy not work, it resulted in economic
disaster for Japan.5 8 In the 1980s the Reagan administration, to reduce
the growing trade deficit with Japan, adopted trade restrictions in the
form of "voluntary" quotas on autos, machine tools, and other
Japanese xports.' 5 In the 1985 Plaza Accord, Japan agreed to accept
a large degree of appreciation of its currency, the yen, against the U.S.
dollar.16 0 These actions failed to make even a dent in the U.S. trade
deficit with Japan.161 In 1985, the trade deficit was $46 billion;'
62 and
in 1989 the deficit was $49 billion.' 6 3 In Japan the doubling of the yen
contributed to an asset bubble, which caused great economic problems
in that country.' 64 The trade deficit with the United States was
temporaril lowered only in 1990-92, when Japan's bubble economy
collapsed. But the deficit with Japan rebounded in 1993 to over $59
billion, and it remains high today. In 2017, it was $69 billion.1
66
(discussing how China uses dollars gained through exports to the U.S. to buy
treasuries).
157 Lee Branstetter, Do Trade Restrictions Work? Lessonsfrom Trade with Japan





160 Takatoshi Ito, The Plaza Agreement andJapan: Reflection on the 30th Year
Anniversary 3-4 (Sep. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/Oeb0adI6/WorkingPaper-Plaza-Ito-
092815.pdf
161 Branstetter, supra note 157.
162 U.S. CNSus BURITAU, TRADF INGooDsWITil JAPAN (2019),
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5880.htmi (rounding to the nearest
billion).
13Id.
164For analysis of the Plaza Accord, see Maurice Obstfeld, Time of Troubles: The
Yen andJapan's Economy 4-6; 51-89 (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper No. 14816, 2009), https://www.nber.org/papers/wl
48 1 6 .
165 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 162.
16 Id.
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Trade import restrictions and currency changes will not sink the
trade deficit because excessive foreign imports constitute only the
symptoms not the root cause of the trade deficit. The root cause of the
U.S. trade deficit is the current macroeconomic structure of the U.S.
economy, which emphasizes consumption and government spending
and disincentives saving. The four components of U.S. GDP are: (1)
consumer spending; (2) investment; (3) net exports; and (4)
government spending.16 7 Of these the two most important are the first
and last, consumer and government spending. Consumer spending is
emphasized in the United States with consumer spending hovering
around 70% of GDP.16 8 The second major component, government
spending, is excessive and virtually out of control. According to the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the combination of the unfunded
tax cut enacted by the Congress in 2017, and the $1.3 trillion
government spending bill enacted in 2018, mean that the U.S. budget
deficit will rise to 804 billion in fiscal 2019, and will exceed $1 trillion
in fiscal 2020.169
The structure of the American economy that emphasizes consumer
spending means that the personal savings rate in the United States is
quite low. In December 2017 the U.S. personal savings rate fell to
2.4% a twelve-year low.' 7 0 The U.S. personal savings rate since 1960,
16 BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, BEA18-31, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT: FIRST
QUARTER 2018 (THIRD ESTIMATE) CORPORATE PROFITS: FIRST QUARTER 2018
(REVISED ESTIMATE) 4 (2018), available at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-
07/gdplql8 3rd_0.pdf.
See Kimberly Amadeo, The Components ofGDP Explained, THE BALANCE
(July 10, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/components-of-gdp-explanation-
formula-and-chart-3306015.
1 Jeff Stein, Deficit to top $1 trillion per year by 2020, CBO says, WASH. POST
(April 10, 2018, 4:35 PM),
https://beta.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/deficit-to-top-I-trillion-per-
year-by-2020-cbo-says/2018/04/09/93c331d4-3cOe-11e8-a7d1-
e4efec6389fOstory.html; Damian Paletta & Erica Werner, How Congress's and
Trump's Latest Deficit Binge Paved the Wayfor the Next One, WASH. POST (Apr.
16, 2018, 11:24 AM), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-
congress-and-trumps-latest-deficit-binge-paved-the-way-for-the-next-
one/2018/04/15/2dl98608-3f2f-1Ie8-8d53-eba0ed2371cc story.html.
170 Jeffy Bartash, Why the Saving Rate Falling to a 12-Year Low Is Not a Death
Knellfor the U.S. Economy, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 30, 2018, 1:53 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-the-savings-rate-falling-to-a-12-year-
low-is-not-a-death-knell-for-the-us-economy-2018-01-29.
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has averaged only 8.2%, 171one of the lowest rates in the developed
world.1 72 From a macroeconomic standpoint, the United States has a
severe shortage of domestic savings with which to fund two very
important items of its economy - investment and thefiscal deficit.
Where does the money come from every year to fund these two
critical items? Answer: foreign capital. The United States needs and is
dependent upon importing massive amounts of foreign capital every
year to fund needed U.S. investment and the U.S. budget deficit
because domestic savings alone cannot do the job.
And where do foreigners get the dollars to supply the capital
needed by the U.S. economy? Answer: from their trade surpluses with
the United States. George P. Schultz, former U.S. secretary of Labor,
Treasury and State, and Martin Feldstein, professor of economics at
Harvard and former Chairman of the U.S. Council of Economic
Advisors, put it succinctly: "If a country consumes more than it
produces, it must import more than it exports. That's not a rip-off,
that's arithmetic .... Federal deficit spending, a massive and continuing
act of dissaving, is the culprit. Control that spending and you will
control trade deficits."' 73 Schultz makes the further important point
that the trade deficit cannot be "fixed" by taking measures that close
the deficit with one or a few countries.174 Unless fundamental
macroeconomic reform is undertaken, reductions in deficits with a
country like China will only result in deficit increases with other
nations. The overall trade deficit will remain.
7' Fli. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis, FRED: PERSONAL SAVING RATE available at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PSAVERT (average of saving rate percentages for
the range of Jan. 1, 1960 to May 1, 2018).
172 Maria Lamagna, Why Americans Are Some ofthe World's Worst Savers,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 14, 2016, 2:34 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-americans-are-some-of-the-worlds-
worst-savers-2016-04-14.
1n George Shultz & Martin Feldstein, Opinion, Everything You Need to Know





7 Id.; see also Martin Feldstein, Inconvenient Truths About the U.S. Trade Deficit,
NAT'I. BUREAU O ECON. RESEARCH (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/feldstein/projectsyndicateapr252017.pdf.
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Analysis of the macroeconomic root causes of the trade deficit
points the way toward macroeconomic reforms that will sink this
deficit ifwe wish to make them. The solutions are quite simple, but
politically complex. Three things should be done. First, as Schultz and
Feldstein state, Congress must act to reduce the U.S. budget deficit.
Second, economic incentives should be put in place to stimulate
domestic savings. Third, tax measures should be put in place to
stimulate American exports.
Tax reform can incentivize saving. At present, if we save money,
we must pay a good portion of the money we earn from saving to the
IRS in taxes. Americans are presently taxed on earnings from savings
at ordinary income rates, so high-earners -who are most likely to save
money - are taxed on their savings-earnings at the marginal rate of
37%.176 Thus, if such a person earns a dollar from savings, he or she
will get to keep only sixty-three cents of the money earned; thirty-
seven cents will go to the U.S. government. By contrast, our high-
earning individual is not taxed at all by the federal government on his
or her spending. State sales taxes vary, but the average tax is 6.5%.177
Thus, it is far more advantageous from a taxation standpoint to spend
rather than to save money in the United States.
Reducing the trade deficit through tax reform would mean some
combination of reducing the taxes on savings-earnings and increasing
the taxes on consumption. For example, Congress could enact a tax
bill reducing the individual income tax rates substantially and
instituting some form of national consumption tax. In the European
Union, for example, member nations collect national "value-added"
taxes that range as high as 25%.17 In fact, virtually every nation, over
140 countries, including all major trade partners of the United States,
176 See Amir El-Sibaie, 2018 Tax Brackets, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://taxfoundation.org/2018-tax-brackets/ (listing the highest marginal tax rate
on income to be 37%).
1n Jared Walczak & Scott Drenkard, State and Local Sales Tax Rates 2018, FISCAL
FACT No. 572, TAx FOUND. 5 (Feb. 2018),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180313143458/Tax-Foundation-FF572.pdf
(number derived by averaging the state's, excluding D.C., combined state and local
sales tax rate).
178 Randall Holcombe, The Value Added Tax: Too Costlyfor the United States, 5
(Mercatus Ctr., 2010), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/VAT.Special-Study.-
Holcombe.pdf.
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levy a national tax on consumption, with some exemptions, such as for
medicines and foodstuffs.17 9
It is virtually certain that the foregoing tax reforms, accompanied
by getting the federal budget under control, would immediately begin
to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. Since this tax reform would incentivize
saving by taxing spending, the U.S. savings rate would also rise,
replacing, to some degree, the need for imported foreign capital. Such
reform would also greatly incentivize U.S. companies to export,
because, under international rules, a national consumption tax may be
collected at the border on imported products'8
0 and is rebated on
exports.' 8 Thus, a 10% consumption tax enacted by the United States
Congress would tax all imports 10% in addition to the applicable tariff
and U.S. exporters would get a rebate of 10%, the amount of the
79 Kyle Pomerlau, How Many Countries in the World Have a Value-Added Tax?,
TAX FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/how-many-countries-
world-have-value-added-tax/.
180 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 Art. 111:2 (1994). At
present the United States is the only important trading nation in the world that does
not benefit from substantial tax rebates on exported products. Since 1971, the U.S.
Congress has tried to remedy this situation by enacting tax incentives for U.S.
exporters. In this endeavor, the U.S. has been rebuffed at every turn because
solutions have been found illegal under international law. See Panel Report, United
Slates Tax Legislation (DISC), GATT Doc. L/4422 (adopted Nov. 2 1976);
Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatmentfor "Foreign Sales
Corporations, " WT Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20 2000); Appellate
Body Report, United States-Tax Treatmentfor "Foreign Sales Corporations, "
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WTO Doc.
WT/DSI08/AB/RW (adopted Jan. 29 2002).
181 The WTO rules on subsidies allow rebates of taxes to exporters for direct but
not indirect taxes. Consumption taxes are considered direct taxes. See World Trade
Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex 1(e)
(1994). Another variety of tax that would have an ameliorating impact on the U.S.
trade deficit is a Carbon Tax on all domestic products made or produced by burning
carbon fuels. This tax would vary depending on the volume of fossil fuel consumed
in the making of each category of products. See James Baker Ill, et al., The
Conservative Casefor Carbon Dividends (2017), available at
http://www.cicouncil.org/media/TheConservativeCaseforCarbon Dividends.pdf.
This tax, known as the "Baker Plan," is proposed to be "tax neutral" in that the tax
collected would be returned in full to the American people in some fashion, either
directly or through cuts in other taxes. Since the rules of the GATT (Art. 111:2(a))
permit a tax levied on domestic products to be also levied at the border on imported
products, this tax would be an across-the-board tax on imports. Since this tax
qualifies for border tax adjustment under the rules of the WTO Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement, Annex 1 (h), (i) and footnote 61, U.S.
exporters would receive a rebate of 100% of Carbon tax paid upon the export of
any products of U.S. origin.
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consumption tax they have to pay on domestic sales. Taxing imports
(through a consumption tax not through tariffs) and exempting exports
would operate to reduce the trade deficit as net U.S. exports would
doubtless greatly increase. The U.S. trade deficit would fall
dramatically through enactment of these simple but important
measures. Regretfully, although these are simple measures, they lack
political support due to the political culture in the United States.
Politicians have a responsibility to educate the public as to the great
advantages of these policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The international trade and investment policies of the United States
under President Donald J. Trump represent an historical turning point
in the post-World War II era. The nationalist tone of "America First"
policies threatens to isolate the United States and divide the world into
economic spheres of influence. The USMCA, although it contains
worrisome provisions, is better than the alternative of ending NAFTA
and terminating the North American free trade area. The USMCA
deserves favorable consideration as it preserves the core of NAFTA
and incorporates updated provisions drawn from the TPP.
Nevertheless, the USMCA contains many worrisome and problematic
provisions. Certain of the American "advantage" provisions of the
USMCA, although designed with the purpose of revitalizing the
American economy, may backfire, isolating the United States. The
USMCA also will fail as a tool to end U.S. trade deficits. Rebalancing
trade may be accomplished only by attending to macroeconomic
factors that plague the United States economy. A macroeconomic
solution to U.S. trade imbalances is within our grasp if we have the
political will to embrace it.
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